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Abstract 
 
This paper develops a topological approach derived from Kurt Lewin to analyse the 
psychological life space/s produced in a mental health service user’s home. Drawing on 
arguments that space plays an important part in the organisation and management of 
mental distress, photographs of a service user’s home are analysed as topological spaces. 
The paper argues that topological theory can contribute to community health 
psychology through framing psychological distress as spatially distributed, meaning 
individual bodies, environments and action are conceptualised as equally contributing 
to the organisation and management of health related experience and activity.   
 
 
Introduction 
 
Understanding health in relation to space and context has been an emergent enterprise 
in community health psychology in recent years (Hodgetts, Radley, Chamberlain & 
Hodgetts, 2007). This article seeks to add to existing community health psychology 
literature through developing a topological approach that conceptualises psychological 
experience as spatially distributed, and as such, avoids a dualistic modeling of the 
relationship between individual and environment. Furthermore, a contribution to 
existing spatial literature in community health psychology is made in the form of a 
topological approach to distress based on analysis of a service user's home space. 
Reductions in mental health funding for voluntary sector and social service run day 
centres are leading to closures of valuable community spaces, resulting in service users 
potentially spending greater proportions of time at home (Needham, 2011). One result of 
this is that home space is becoming a key part of mapping the territories that constitute 
‘community’ (i.e. non-in patient) mental health (Tucker, 2010a, 2010b). In this paper 
photographs of a service user’s home will be analysed from a topological perspective in 
which psychological experience is conceptualised as spatially distributed.  
 
Space has been argued to be central to understanding self and identity, based on the 
premise that different spaces can produce different aspects of the self (Dixon & 
Durrheim, 2004). This is part of relatively recent social and community psychological 
research that has begun to address the issue of space, not just as another element of our 
social worlds, but as a designator of the kind of experience psychological activity takes 
(e.g. Dixon & Durrheim, 2004; Tucker, 2010b). Influetial to this move is the long history 
of work in human geography that has demonstrated the benefits of approaching 
experience as a spatially bound activity (e.g. Massey, 2005; Callard, 2004; Thrift, 2008). In 
the field of mental health, space has featured in work looking at relationsips between 
space and incidence of mental distress (Williams, 1999), along with how certain spaces 
can be designed as therapeutic (Gesler, 2003). Studies have also categorised mental 
distress as spatially bound in diagnostically-specific ways, e.g. in relation to delusions 
(Parr, 1999). Geographies of mental health (e.g. Parr, 1999), though, have tended to 
adopt a model of space that imbues certain spaces (e.g. garden projects) with properties 
that can be afforded those who interact w ith such places. Topology offers a potentially 
useful addition to such work, in terms of considering psychological experience as, by 
definition, spatial, rather than as dependent on the extensive properties of certain 
spaces. 
 
 
 
Kurt Lewin’s Topology 
 
Topological psychology has its roots in the Gestaltian theorising of Kurt Lewin, which 
applied ideas from theoretical physics to develop a spatialised form of psychology. 
“ [E]very psychological event depends upon the state of the person and at the same time 
the state of the environment”  (1936: 12). Lewin did not view psychological processes as 
operating according to individual inherent sets of properties, but as produced in concert 
w ith other objects (human and non-human) in psychological life spaces:  
 
“ [I]t is not thought then that the environment of the individual serves merely to 
facilitate or inhibit tendencies which are established once and for all in the nature 
of the person. One can hope to understand the forces that govern behaviour only 
if one includes in the representation the whole psychological situation”  (1936: 
12).  
 
The concept of life space is defined as the “ whole psychological situation” , in which 
‘person’ and ‘environment’ are understood as co-constituents of a given situation. 
Crucially, there is no pre-figured theoretical distinction made between the individual 
and environment (which distinguishes Lewin’s topology from contemporary 
environmental psychology for example). For Lewin, not having pre-defined properties 
means being subject to the potential for context-dependent formation, in which “ the 
centre of interest shifts from objects to processes”  (1936: 16). Fundamentally, Lewin was 
interested in developing a non-reductionist approach to the study of psychology. He 
was put off by classic psychological problems, such as the relationship between 
perception and representation, and instead sought a more pragmatic approach in 
arguing that “ what is real is what has effects”  (1936: 19). Viewing psychological 
processes as distinctly separate from environmental ones was an error for Lewin. His 
topological approach set out to overcome such dualistic thinking in favour of a relational 
model of distribution.  
 
Brian Massumi captures the point that topology is not about space, but about seeing 
experience as spatial; “ cognitive mapping is secondarily applied to the experience of 
space, or the space of experience”  (2002: 181). Topology is not then about rendering 
psychological processes as dependent upon spatial categories, because “ [I]t is rather a 
description of psychological events from the perspective of the distribution of potential 
experiences”  (Brown, 2012: 140). The concepts of region and boundary are key to 
designating the form that a particular topological space will take. Boundaries are not 
necessarily designated by physical objects, but can be produced through intensive 
processes, e.g. an angry look. A region is important is it marks out the 'psychological life 
space/ s of movement’ within a given boundary. A key aspect of regions is that they are 
subject to change at any time, w ith the range of possible psychological events contigent 
on the topological ordering of the region. Thus, in undertaking topological analysis, 
concern is on the forms of region existent in a given situation. In developing his 
spatialised approach to psychology Lewin deemed intensive factors (e.g. emotions, 
motivations) important, rather than analysing the extensive properties of a space (e.g. 
size, shape). In terms of mental health, this means that distress can be framed as 
occurring in the form of psychological events that take a topological form. The 
characteristics of psychological events are dependent on the intensive relationships that 
manifest the topological space. This is another key reason that topology is of value to 
psychology, namely that is presents psychological activity as central to the organisation 
of environments, and therefore communities and culture. Topological appoaches have 
started to populate the social sciences (see recent special issue of Theory, Culture & 
Society, 2012), and it is with these in mind, that this paper develops.  
 
 
Topology and Communi ty M ental  Heal th  
 
 
 
Developing a topological approach provides an empirically grounded theory of the 
relationship/ s between individuals and communities that can broaden the boundaries of 
existing community health and mental health literature. The topological framing of 
psychological experience as spatial is of considerable value to community health 
psychology because of the inherent focus it places on relationality and context. 
Furthermore, the non-dualistic rendering of individual and environment means all 
psychological activity is, in effect, potentially collective in terms of being intrinsically 
connected to others (both humans and objects). However, the starting point is never a 
particular ‘place’ (i.e. a context with existing meaning and signification), but rather 
identifying the psychological life space/ s in which an individual experiences their  
mental distress. Life spaces are not necessarily spatially dependent (i.e. occurring in a 
pre-existing place), because notions of distance, size and scale are irrelevant in 
topological theorising. For instance, Lewin stated “ there is no topological difference 
between a drop of water and a sphere the size of the sun”  (1936: 88). Hence, topology is 
an innovative and valuable broadening of current  health psychology literature through 
its focus on the spatial distribution of health related activity and experience. This allows 
for a significant contextualisation of health and wellbeing, as no aspect is reduced to the 
level of the individual, but always understood in terms of individual and environment 
as multiple topological spaces.  
 
 
M ethod 
 
The use of photographs with interviews is becoming a well established form of visual 
ethnography. For instance, Gillian Rose (2007) argues that images are instilled with their 
own power relations which are then negotiated between the visual image and the 
viewer. In this way, photographs are taken and displayed as a means of indicating 
certain social experiences and relationships (Pink, 2006). Hurdley (2007) supports the 
position that photographs are not merely snapshots taken without thought and 
planning, but are bound up with cultural norms, hierarchy (in terms of selection) and 
social identity. In this way, selected photographs for display and analytic interpretation 
can become part of the production of symbolic spaces; they are presented to the viewer 
w ith the intention to communicate a visual record of the cultural self at that moment in 
time (Ruby, 2005). This makes analysis of photographs valuable for topological analysis 
as they provide a visual presentation of psychological life spaces, which when combined 
with accompanying narratives, provide insight into how psychological events are 
spatially distributed. The analysis fits the recent move in psychology to recruit, where 
possible, visual reference points for participants to engage with when talking about their 
lives (see Reavey, 2012).  
 
In the following section we see two photographs of domestic spaces of a mental health 
service user, Steve, who was one of four participants invited to take photographs using 
either a digital or disposable camera (supplied by the research team). Participants were 
asked to take photographs of their home/ garden spaces over a period of two weeks. 
Participants were then interviewed to give them the opportunity to discuss their 
photographs. There were no other instructions given apart from requesting that 
photographs of other people were not taken due to ethical concerns. The research team 
were not present at any time during this process. It is also worth noting that originally a 
video camcorder was purchased for the purpose of exploring home spaces and mental 
distress but due to the relatively high cost of the equipment together w ith the potential 
vulnerability of people such as Steve (i.e. being subject to harassment w ithin his 
immediate neighbourhood) this was deemed a risk to a participant’s wellbeing. 
Nevertheless, the photographs offer a valuable way of visually the home, and when 
analysed with the participant narratives, to undertake a topological analysis.  
 
 
 
The analysis focuses on illuminating some of the potential distribution/ s of 
psychological experience in and through Steve’s home, and his role as an active agent in 
its organisation. The photographs below were taken by Steve, a 50-year-old service user, 
who lived alone in a one-bedroom local authority property in a large provincial town in 
the East Midlands, UK. Steve has received a diagnosis of ‘paranoid schizophrenia’ 
whose mother had died two years previously, which he reports as having a devastating 
impact on his life. A lthough Steve’s mother had died two years previously, it was a 
subject that he often discussed especially at times when he felt lonely and isolated.  
 
 
 
D istributions of  psychological  activi ty in domestic space/s 
 
The first photograph below is of Steve’s kitchen. In analysing it along with Steve’s 
narrative it is not the space in and of itself that is the ‘life space’, but its connection with 
Steve’s everyday life: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“ That’s my kitchen right and there’s two sides to it and that’s what mum gave 
me um a cooker and that’s an old dishwasher which was me mum’s which she left 
me when she died and I miss her and doing errands for her..and it’s well you can 
see it’s not a big kitchen and um messy (laughs) so I thought I’ll show you my 
kitchen (laughs) and that’s a drainer (laughs) and as you can see I can be very 
lazy when I’m on me own and I’ve got this stuff here cos’ I’d have to pay to have 
it taken away and they um the Council they charge five quid to do that um looks 
and that’s why my house looks like it does um looks like a scrapyard don’t it? 
(laughs)”  
 
 
  
 
 
At first glance Steve’s kitchen appears messy and lacking structure, with the presence of 
a dishwasher (the front right of which is visible in the photograph), seemingly out of 
place in the middle of the room. It is situated in the centre of the kitchen, alongside a 
rubbish bin. Despite the space, to use Steve’s words, “ looking like a scrapyard” , some 
forms of functionality can be seen. For instance, although the bin is in the centre of the 
room it contains a bin bag and is relatively empty, suggesting it is regularly emptied and 
works as part of a functional process of managing domestic waste. Practices that may 
take place on the worktop, such as making a cup of tea, now take place on the 
dishwasher. Cutlery is placed in a cutlery basket, and whilst there is some crockery 
awaiting washing, the amount is not significant and would not look out of place in 
many domestic spaces across the country.  
 
 
Some of the kitchen is of course fixed, such as the cabinets, sink etc, meaning Steve has 
to work with a semi-stable space.  However, the regions of possible distributed 
psychological events are not solely dependent on the fixed physical aspects of the space. 
To analyse it only as a physical space is to potentially miss the intensive psychological 
possibilities. When analysed in conjunction with Steve’s narrative we can see how the 
region/ s created facilitate a link to the past in terms of the relationship to his mother. 
The dishwasher acts to mark out a remembrance space, in which memories of his 
mother can be recalled. When Steve connects w ith the dishwasher through his everyday 
activities (e.g. making a cup of tea) he is creating a region that links him to his mother. To 
remove the dishwasher would be to remove the possibility for the experience of linking 
with his mother. So, although at first the dishwasher’s positioning may seem to restrict 
activity by obstructing movement, by existing centrally it becomes an object w ith 
multiple opportunities for connection in a topological sense. Indeed, moving in that 
space almost always involves connecting with the dishwasher, either directly through 
placing things on it (ashtray, coffee, sugar), or indirectly, through moving around it. So, 
instead of seeing the kitchen as unstructured, it can be seen to act as a multi-functional 
space enabling, in relation with the ‘object’ of Steve himself, a set of actions, some 
operating at an everyday level (e.g. the management of domestic waste) and some at an 
emotional level (e.g. sadness at loss of his mother). The kitchen space, as boundaried by 
brick walls and entry/ exit door, becomes a psychological life space in which Steve’s 
thoughts, feelings and emotions are made possible through its organisation and 
management.  
 
This is not to suggest that the kitchen space forms an enduring stability. It may well 
change, as Steve could consider the time has come to remove the dishwasher and re-
organise the space in a more traditional fashion. He mentions the requirement to pay the 
local council to remove the dishwasher, which in the future, he may have the means to 
do. If that were the case then a new set of psychological life spaces would be made 
possible, requiring their own topological analysis. As it stands we see the importance of 
Steve having a space in which he has some level of personal control. However, the space 
is not always private, w ith its organisation conducted in relation to conversations and 
negotiations Steve has with others (e.g. support workers) about his on going levels of 
distress, particularly since the loss of his mother. Steve's kitchen can be analysed as part 
of a journey, a 'transition through life' space, with its specific organisation being 
temporally specific. He may feel different next week. The topological point is that we 
need to analyse, in concert w ith Steve's narrative, the psychological events made 
possible in the relations between the objects, Steve and the regions and boundaries 
formed. In the following data extract we see another context in which Steve’s life spaces 
emerge, namely his lounge: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Steve – That’s me garden there  
Lesley-Ann – is there any reason you don’t grow anything there? 
Steve – Well it’s myself mmm (1) and the main reason that it’s not attractive 
(Lesley-Ann=mmm) and the main sort of um eh and I just took it there just to 
show that I live on my own and eh mmm (2) I mmm just lost me mum which is 
hard to get over…. I don’t let anybody take over my place or touch my place in 
any way...when I get home I shut the door and it’s my world and no-one 
else’s...and now in the July to September breaks you’ll get youngsters harassing 
me and calling me a paedophile  like that and it’s not very nice...you know 
youngsters in cars chasing you round in cars and then I think I’ll have a panic 
attack which I did a fortnight ago 
 
In this picture we can see Steve’s lounge and part of his garden. Of interest is how the 
garden acts as an intermediary boundary between the assumed privacy of home, and the 
public space outside. Boundaries act to determine the setting of possible actions within 
the regions they define. In this photograph we see that care is taken to keep the lounge 
reasonably well ordered, and arranged in a way that is quite distinct from the kitchen. 
For Steve organising the home space is done with awareness of the possible range of 
problematic connections outside the home that he seeks to “ lock himself away”  from (e.g. 
the experience of being harassed and bullied by local teenagers). The potential visibility 
of his lounge from outside results in a desire to organise it in a way that w ill not 
exacerbate the negative relations he can experience outside home. This may not be 
successful, but a space is produced that distributes Steve’s psychological experience in 
such a way that attempts to minimise possibilities for bullying and intimidation. Doing 
so involves creating small regions with limited possibilities for new connections to be 
made. This though does not stop Steve presenting a semi-open boundary through 
leaving the door open. A region is created with the outside space that potentially allows 
for Steve to enter and engage with it. Whether he does is not the prime concern, the 
 
 
point, from a topological perspective, is that the open door links inside and outside as 
one region, rather than present them as distinct spaces. The difficulty Steve has is 
combining the linking of inside and outside with his desire to develop what Lewin 
called closed regions, namely a closed off and private lounge area. The open door has a 
psychological function as it delineates the boundary between Steve and his immediate 
neighbourhood. This presents numerous possibilities for psychological action. For 
example, it potentially allows Steve to feel more engaged with the immediate 
community and feel more at ease with the ‘outside’ looking in. It also enables Steve to 
have ‘one foot in, one foot out’, as he discusses showing his garden to the viewer as a 
way of accentuating his loneliness “ I just took it show you I live on my own” . He has 
opened up to the outside world but the door when closed can also shut that world out, 
“ when I get home I shut the door and it’s my world” . In this way, a door being open or 
closed can allow different possibilities and emotions to emerge, which in turn points to 
the possibilities for multiple ‘life spaces’ to be produced.  
 
Steve’s reluctance to leave the home is evident in the rather general response he gives to 
the question as to why he is not more creative with his garden (“ it’s not attractive” ) and 
that he only took the lounge photograph to demonstrate he lives alone (which is 
something the interviewer already knew, and the evidence for which was not specific to 
the lounge). What we see is the challenge in managing space that can be produced in 
multiple ways through connecting regions, with the anxieties that can exist in relation to 
leaving home space. Despite these challenges, having a space in one’s control is seen to 
be important. Of course, this is conducted on the back of the negative connections Steve 
has experienced near his home. Were he able to form more productive relations the 
nature of his home would also be susceptible to change (e.g. he may start doing more in 
the garden). The point is that none of this can be easily captured in models that focus 
primarily on spaces as physical entities with extensive properties, rather than mapping 
the psychological events made possible through regions and boundaries created through 
intensive processes.  
 
 
 
 
 
D iscussion 
 
The topological argument developed directs us towards analysing home spaces as 
setting the conditions of possibility for actual experiences. In this sense, we cannot map 
experience directly onto the photographs, i.e. analyse them in terms of actual 
experiences. Instead, we can fruitfully consider home spaces constituted as multiple 
psychological life spaces, whereby analysis focuses on what possibilities for action exist 
therein. A  topological approach is therefore not about analysing specific instances of 
action, but rather the spatial settings through which experience is produced, in concert 
w ith the objects (human and non-human). In Steve’s photographs we saw the setting, or 
impersonal conditions (Brown, 2012), through which possibilities for action and movement 
unfold. Engaging in visual analysis necessarily involves interpreting a snapshot, a 
momentary situation as Lewin calls it. The background life situation is always present, and 
yet all aspects of it w ill never come to the fore in any given momentary situation. For 
Steve, any number of aspects of his life situation could be present in the organisation of 
his home space, e.g. emotional reaction to loss of mother, medication regimen, social 
exclusion, lack of employment and/ or social relationships.  
 
A  topological reading also opens up the potential for change, although not a notion that 
by definition is seen as ‘good’. It can be potentially anxiety provoking and complex, 
involving shifting life spaces and multiple ‘actors’. For instance, Steve’s space is subject 
to the scrutiny of his key worker, who may base decisions regarding his wellbeing on its 
presentation and organisation. In this sense, home space for service users is not 
 
 
necessarily private, but open to potential surveillance. The argument being made is that 
it would benefit from attention not just from mental health services, but also from 
academics and researchers, keen to emphasise the benefits of close analysis of the 
organisation of homes as part of multiple life spaces. Not singular, but plural, w ith many 
forms of potential connection possible. Demonstrating the fluidity of experience, not just 
in a simple deconstructionist sense, but as something that needs managing and 
organising, w ill help to understand more about how community mental health is played 
out and experienced by service users.  
 
The implications of such a move are several. Firstly, identifying the primary spaces in 
which ‘community care’ is experienced (e.g. in the home). Secondly, by placing specific 
focus on the actions and activity of service users in managing their day-to-day lives. The 
potential for exclusion and discrimination in community mental health is well known. A 
greater spotlight on the kinds of localised practices of service users themselves allows 
for understanding of what it can mean to live within current systems of mental health 
care, and how service users orient to, and negotiate, the challenges and dilemmas 
present. Furthermore, emphasising the need to bring analysis of service users’ space to 
the forefront of mental health research and practice can help to draw attention to the 
incessant pressure of the everyday. The impact of this for services could be an increasing 
focus on how people’s distress is based upon often quite nuanced relationships between 
individual bodies and spaces, rather than as a discrete set of symptoms. Furthermore, it 
helps to highlight that reducing service user only spaces (e.g. day centres) does not 
necessarily increase social inclusion by integrating service users into mainstream spaces, 
but can increase isolation by forcing an increased proportion of everyday life to be 
organised around domestic home spaces.  
 
In suggesting a topological approach to the analysis of community mental health, we are 
not proposing specific geometrical models of particular spaces. Topology does not take 
one form, but needs to take form dependent on the empirical problem at hand (Brown, 
2012). Topology is one way to move beyond the dualistic thinking of subject-
environment, in which space is seen as representative of people’s inner state. What is 
important is to analyse the life spaces of service users, and to be open to interpretations 
that do not simply reduce reading of such spaces in terms of good or bad mental health. 
A  topological approach involves a potentially more complex reading, attuned to the 
range of potential relations and connections made possible therein. For example, the 
notion that spaces can have multiple functions, which are continually subject to change. 
Managing change can be a problematic activity, as we saw with Steve when organising 
his domestic space following the loss of his mother. This change led to practices that 
others may interpret as problematic, and yet, for Steve, served a functional role in the 
distribution of his emotional activity during the transition to life w ithout his mother.  
 
Knowing more about where service users spend their time, given reductions to service-
provided spaces, is a vital task for understanding the distribution of psychological 
experience with regard to mental distress. In doing so we can uncover the everyday 
practices of ‘self-care’ developed by service users, and in doing so start to piece together 
the spaces of community mental health, and how service users themselves manage and 
organise them. Doing so would develop understanding of how communities of mental 
health are changing due to cuts in public spending, and also how key spaces are often 
outside of formal care provision (e.g. homes). Paying close analytic attention to service 
users’ everyday activities demonstrates the value given to their role in knowledge 
production about mental health, and subsequent efforts to apply such knowledge in 
strategies to improve wellbeing and recovery. Only then can we gain a thorough 
understanding of the challenges service users face in community settings and the kinds 
of strategies enacted when negotiating such obstacles.  
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